Abstract Previous research has shown adverse effects of growing up under unilateral divorce laws on long-term outcomes of children. It remains an open question of whether these effects of early childhood conditions arise due to divorce laws raising the likelihood of parental marital disruption or whether unilateral divorce laws also affect children in intact marriages by changing intra-household bargaining. Using recently available data from SHARELIFE for 11 Western European countries, we address this question employing a difference-in-differences approach and controlling for childhood family structure and socioeconomic status. Like previous research, we find adverse effects of growing up under unilateral divorce laws on the well-being of children. This effect remains even when controlling for childhood variables. We conclude that unilateral divorce laws affect children by changing family bargaining in intact marriages.
Introduction
There is now a large body of literature showing a negative association between parental divorce and children's outcomes such as well-being and education (for a meta-analysis see Amato and Keith (1991) and Amato (2001) ). There is also some evidence that liberalized divorce laws in USA (Gruber 2004) and Europe (González and Viitanen 2008) had an adverse effect on children's outcomes. It is an open question, however, whether this effect arises because liberalized divorce laws lead to more divorces and, in effect, economic distress, particularly among female household heads or because liberalized divorce laws change the bargaining process within households and thus the investment into children's human capital (Gruber 2004) or both. In this paper, we address this latter question by exploiting cross-national variation in the introduction of unilateral divorce laws across Europe using a difference-in-differences approach and newly available data from SHARELIFE containing information on family composition and socioeconomic status during childhood. Controlling for these childhood variables allows us to address the question whether unilateral divorce laws had an effect primarily by affecting family composition or whether there are other potential mechanisms at work-a question which could not be answered with the data used in Gruber (2004) and González and Viitanen (2008) . Using SHARELIFE data has the additional advantage that we can study the long-term effects of divorce legislation over much of the life cycle as the respondents are 50+ years old; other studies have typically been analyzing outcomes in childhood or in young adulthood. We focus on long-term outcomes similar to the ones that have been studied in the literature before: physical and mental health and health behavior (Dawson 1991; ChaseLansdale et al. 1995; Cherlin et al. 1998) , demographic outcomes (Keith and Finlay 1988; Cherlin et al. 1995; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999) , and education (Keith and Finlay 1988) .
There are three main explanations for the negative effect of divorce on children's outcomes (Amato and Keith 1991) : first, usually one parent leaves the household and there is less contact between this parent and the child, but also the custodial parent may have competing demands on her time. Both will lead to a reduction in parental time spent with children. Second, divorces are usually associated with economic hardship resulting in lower investments in children's human capital. Third, some argue that it is not divorce per se that is hurting children but family conflicts eventually preceding marital disruption. While some of the literature has controlled for pre-disruption household variables Cherlin et al. 1995 Cherlin et al. , 1998 Kiernan and Cherlin 1999) , there is still the worry that there may be unobserved factors driving both parental marital disruptions and child well-being. In addition, policy makers cannot affect marital disruptions per se but can only reform divorce legislations. For these reasons, some researchers have started looking at the effects of divorce legislation on children's outcomes (Johnson and Mazingo 2000; Gruber 2004; Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito 2008; González and Viitanen 2008) . Similarly to USA, many European countries moved from mutual consent divorce laws to unilateral divorce laws mainly in the 1970s. Under mutual consent law, both partners had to agree to a divorce, while under unilateral law one spouse can leave the marriage without the other's consent.
Only if unilateral divorce laws have effectively raised divorce rates, there would be a possibility that divorce legislation affects children via this channel. However, there is an ongoing controversy whether unilateral divorce laws have in fact increased divorce rates. Becker (1993) argues that under Coasian bargaining there should be no changes in divorce rates. Rather, the introduction of unilateral divorce laws merely shifts property rights within marriages. Whereas under mutual consent divorce laws, the spouse wanting out had to bribe the other he or she can leave unilaterally under the new law. However, in both cases only inefficient marriages are dissolved. There is a long discussion going back to Peters (1986) whether unilateral divorce laws increase divorce rates. While Peters (1986) did not find an effect using cross-sectional data, Friedberg (1998) and Gruber (2004) found some support for the notion that unilateral divorce laws lead to an increase in divorce rates which was usually interpreted as evidence for some violations of the assumptions of Coase's theorem (no transaction costs, transferability of utility, and no informational asymmetries). Wolfers (2006) has shown, however, that the increase in divorce rates was not sustained in USA. Using the same empirical strategy as Wolfers, Kneip and Bauer (2009) and González and Viitanen (2009) found a sustained effect of unilateral divorce laws on divorce rates in Western Europe pointing either to a violation of the applicability of Coase's theorem or other indirect effects of unilateral divorce laws for instance because of depressed investments in marriage-specific capital, e.g., decreasing marital fertility. If the change in unilateral divorce laws led to an increase in divorce rates and divorce itself is bad for children then we expect negative consequences of the change in divorce laws on children's outcomes in Europe.
Regarding a second pathway through which unilateral divorce laws can affect children's outcomes, Gruber (2004) discusses the relative bargaining position of both spouses and the resulting allocation of resources and time within the household. If unilateral divorce laws shift resources away from mothers, there could be a negative effect on children. Furthermore, under unilateral divorce law women may have a higher incentive to invest in their careers and thus they may also invest less time in household production, fertility, and raising children. Kneip et al. (2011) have shown that the shift to unilateral divorce laws had increased female labor force participation in Europe. Yet, there could also be beneficial effects of unilateral divorce laws on children's outcomes. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) , for instance, have shown that there is less distress and physical abuse in families under unilateral divorce laws because it is easier for spouses to leave abusive marriages. They do not investigate directly the consequences of those changes on children's outcomes, but it is plausible that for children in such relationships outcomes may improve overall. Furthermore, Rasul (2005) argues that the change of divorce laws may also lead to a better selection into marriages, a notion for which Kneip et al. (2011) found support using SHARELIFE data. Thus, in the long run, the average match quality in marriages may improve and divorce rates may even fall. Children growing up in these better matched marriages may have better outcomes. It is not clear, however, what the average effect on all children would be in this case if there are also more children born out-of-wedlock or in cohabiting unions.
The question of how divorce laws affect children's outcomes is also of great policy interest. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argue that governments can use divorce laws to influence intra-family distribution and well-being of individuals within marriage by shaping their respective position after marital disruption. Understanding the effects of unilateral divorce may then also shed light on other current reforms of divorce and family laws in Europe. For instance, alimony laws were recently reformed in Germany restricting alimonies for homemakers. This would give additional incentives for women to invest in their careers with potentially similar effects on children's outcomes than the shift to unilateral divorce. Thus, it seems to be crucial to assess the impact of family policies and divorce laws on intra-household bargaining to better understand the impact of other social policies on children's outcomes.
Changes in divorce laws in Europe
Divorce laws have undergone several changes in Europe over approximately the last century. Historically, the first, and perhaps most significant, change was the introduction of divorce as a legal act, which occurred quite early in most countries. A second major change was the introduction of "no-fault" grounds for divorce. By the middle of the twentieth century, the majority of countries had adopted them; the remainder followed during the second half of the century. No-fault grounds were sometimes intended as additional to fault grounds, but most countries eventually installed them in replacement thereof. Moreover, where fault grounds have been kept, they have been decreasingly used and usually do not affect the question of alimony payments (Goode 1993, p. 32) . The third change has been a shift from divorce legislation requiring mutual consent to laws permitting unilateral divorce. Apart from a few outliers, this change mainly took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. Although the shift from mutual consent to unilateral law is often confused with a shift from fault to no-fault law in the literature (perhaps due to the historical concurrence of their introductions in many legislatures), they are conceptually distinct. Theoretically, the shift to unilateral law is of primary interest here, as it affects the assignment of property rights (particularly the right to remarry) to spouses and thus their relative bargaining power. Consequently, this specific time variant characteristic constitutes the key explanatory variable of our analyses. We apply the same coding of this variable as used by Kneip and Bauer (2009) , focusing on what they call a de facto unilateral divorce regime. Such a regime is defined as one in which it is possible to file for divorce without the consent of one's spouse. Divorce will then not follow automatically but can be expected to be granted by judicial verdict if certain requirements (like a specified period of separation) are fulfilled.
Theoretical considerations
There are two ways of how unilateral divorce can potentially affect children's outcomes. First, if unilateral divorce increases divorce rates and divorce is bad for children, one would expect an overall effect of unilateral divorce on children. For instance, Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito (2012) find that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws increased crime rates among cohorts affected as children. Furthermore, they point to the increase in the number of mothers becoming head of households and living below the poverty line as one potential mechanism behind the increase in crime rates. Second, Gruber (2004) argues that the effects of the changes in divorce laws on later life outcomes of children are too large to be explained by the small change in divorce probabilities of parents. Rather, he argues that the switch in divorce laws changed the bargaining behavior within intact marriages. In our later empirical models, we are able to control for household composition and material living standards allowing us to disentangle the two possible mechanisms. In this theoretical part, we focus on the way that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws in Europe may have changed behavior within intact marriages because the potential negative effect of actual divorce on children is perhaps less controversial.
If the introduction of unilateral divorce has increased the probability of divorce, women in intact marriages would have an increased incentive to invest more in their own labor market experience. This puts an additional time burden on mothers and potentially lower investments in children, at least in the absence of quality formal child care. Parkman (1992 Parkman ( , 2000 provides empirical evidence for this proposition and argues that the introduction of unilateral divorce law reduces the incentives of either partner to make sacrifices for the sake of the family and concentrate on more narrowly defined self-interests. Examples include career choices with better opportunities to accommodate family duties or even an interruption of the labor force participation. Kneip et al. (2011) show that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws raised female labor force participation in Europe (see Parkman (1992) and Stevenson (2008) for evidence for USA). This could result in lower levels of supervision and hence worse child outcomes (Cáceres-Delpiano and Giolito 2012). Moreover, increases in labor force participation appear to be linked to child maltreatment in USA (Paxson and Waldfogel 2002) .
Furthermore, we argue that-even in intact marriages-the introduction of unilateral divorce laws has led to a redistribution of resources away from the main child carer, usually the wife. We argue that the mother has a higher incentive to invest in children's human capital because she will usually be the custodial parent in case of divorce. The introduction of unilateral divorce laws shifted the property right to remarry from the partner who wants to stay in the marriage to the spouse who wants to separate and remarry. Empirical evidence shows that men have higher probabilities of re-partnering (Lampard and Peggs 1999) . This suggests that they value the right to remarry higher than women. Additionally, if the main incentive for remarriage is raising children in a new marriage then men have a higher incentive because they have a longer reproductive age than women.
There are three types of bargaining models for spouses providing theoretical predictions on the division of any marital surplus: cooperative models (for instance, Browning and Chiappori 1998; Lundberg and Pollak 1993), noncooperative models (Brown and Flinn 2011) , and models where the mode of behavior is endogenously determined (Flinn 2000; Del Boca and Flinn 2012; Cigno 2012) . All three types of models allow us to make predictions about the effects of unilateral divorce on resource allocation within intact marriages under the assumption that unilateral divorce laws only shift the property rights to remarry.
In Browning and Chiappori's (1998) model, husband and wife maximize a weighted sum of their individual utilities where these weights are given by the relative bargaining strength of the partners. These bargaining weights could reflect relative wages but also "extra-environmental parameters" such as workplace discrimination or changes in divorce laws. If, on average, the switch to unilateral divorce shifted property rights to men, the relative bargaining position of women should be weakened. If women invest more in children, this should negatively affect their outcomes. In an extension of Lundberg and Pollak's (1993) "separate spheres" bargaining model, the switch to unilateral divorce has changed the relevant set of threat points in the cooperative bargaining. In their basic setup, the husband and wife's threat points when reaching an efficient outcome are the utilities that they can reach when reverting to noncooperative (Cournot-Nash) behavior within marriage. However, they argue that for some couples the divorce threat points are more relevant (for divorce threat point models, see Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) ). The switch from mutual consent divorce laws to unilateral divorce laws could have potentially changed the relevant set of threat points. Under mutual consent, no one can unilaterally leave the marriage, and hence the relevant threat points are the utilities attached to the noncooperative behavior within marriage, unless divorce dominates those threat points for both partners. Under unilateral divorce laws, the situation is different. Here, the divorce threat points are the relevant ones if they dominate the utility attached to noncooperative behavior for one spouse. If, for instance, the husband prefers divorce over noncooperative behavior in marriage and the wife prefers noncooperative behavior over divorce, the relevant threat points are more favorable for the woman under mutual consent laws. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 . For the wife, the divorce threat point is dominated by the threat point under noncooperative behavior, while for the husband the situation is reversed. Hence, under mutual consent law, the divorce threat points are not relevant. However, under unilateral divorce law, the husband prefers the divorce threat point over the noncooperative behavior threat point and hence they become the relevant ones. Thus, the transition to unilateral law can change the relevant set of threat points. Brown and Flinn (2011) develop and estimate a noncooperative model of marital behavior and investigate the welfare consequences of different divorce laws and custodial arrangements. While they provide no general theoretical predictions of the effect of unilateral divorce law on spousal welfare, they use US data to structurally estimate their model. Based on this estimate, they find that wives are better off under mutual consent divorce laws than under unilateral divorce laws, although they note that the welfare differences are small compared to the effects of other potential changes in family law. While they estimate this model only on US data and the effects of unilateral divorce laws on wives' welfare are small, we interpret this as evidence in favor of our hypothesis that wives are worse off under unilateral divorce laws than under mutual consent.
In Cigno's 2012 model, the mode of interaction (cooperatively or noncooperatively) is endogenously determined within the model. As the model analyzes the comparative statics of reductions in divorce costs under unilateral divorce regimes with different property division regimes, it is not directly applicable to the situation at hand where we analyze the effects of a shift from mutual consent laws to unilateral divorce laws. One interpretation of this change would be to analyze the comparative statics of a reduction in divorce costs. If unilateral divorce laws only reduced those costs, Cigno's (2012) model would predict that this reduction in divorce costs strengthens the role of marriage as commitment device, resulting in a more efficient outcome. The main child carer can use the threat of divorce because the courts will redistribute wealth in her favor in case a divorce is granted, and a reduction in divorce costs makes this option more attractive for the main child carer. However, if the other spouse values the right to remarry higher, then the redistribution of wealth (including the property right to remarry) is smaller under unilateral divorce than under mutual consent. If this reduction in the generosity of redistribution is sufficiently larger than the reduction in divorce costs, divorce is a less attractive option for the main child carer. It is difficult to pin down exactly the sizes of those effects, but we believe that the property right to remarry should be more valuable than any reduction in divorce costs. Thus, our theoretical prediction crucially hinges on the argument that the main effect of the switch to unilateral divorce laws is a redistribution of property rights and not a reduction in divorce costs.
There are other potential concerns about the theoretical prediction that wives are worse off under unilateral divorce laws which we want to discuss. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) show that there is less physical violence and abuse under unilateral divorce laws. For the specific group of couples with those problems, wives are probably better off under unilateral divorce legislation. As long as the group of those troubled marriages is relative small, however, this should not be a problem for our theoretical argument. Another potential piece of evidence against our theoretical predictions is the fact that in most cases wives file for divorce (Braver et al. 1993 ). However, if divorce is a commitment device as in Cigno (2012) then this is to be expected as the main child carer uses the threat of divorce in order to improve the allocation of goods within marriage.
Data and empirical methods

Data
For our analysis, we use data from SHARELIFE to obtain measures for demographic outcomes, childhood family structure, and socioeconomic status. We match these data to data from waves 1 and 2 from SHARE which contain information on educational attainment, health, and health behavior. We restrict our sample to Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, and Belgium for which we have information on the de facto switch to unilateral divorce law regimes from Kneip and Bauer (2009) . This sample restriction results in 14,881 to 21,326 observations depending on the outcome of interest.
As outcome measures, we use indicators for human capital investments in children (both education and health) and, in addition, we investigate indicators of family formation. As a measure of education, we use years of education based on ISCED categories. Health variables include self-rated health and the presence of depressive symptoms. We transformed self-rated health in a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent assessed her health in the highest category ("very good"). Similarly, the presence of depressive symptoms is a binary variable indicating a value of 4 or higher on the Euro-D scale (Prince et al. 1999) . We also use binary indicators for overweight (BMI >25) and a dummy taking the value of 1 if the respondent has ever smoked as indicators of health behaviors. As indicators of family formation, we use a dummy for ever being married and a dummy for having children. Thus, with the exception of years of education, all our outcome measures are binary.
Our main explanatory variable is unilateral which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place in the country of the respondent at age 18. Table 1 provides a summary of the introduction of unilateral divorce laws in those European countries along with the number of observations in each country. In most countries, all individuals have grown up under mutual consent divorce laws with the exception of Sweden where unilateral divorce was already introduced in 1915. We only observe a substantial number of observations under both divorce regimes in Denmark and the Netherlands. Hence, in our difference-in-differences design, the identification of the effect of unilateral divorce comes mainly from those two countries and to a lesser extent from France and Belgium.
We also use measures about childhood socioeconomic status and family composition as additional explanatory variables. These variables include a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent was living with both parents at age 10. In SHARELIFE, respondents were also asked about the number of books in the household when growing up. We construct a binary variable <10 books if the respondent reports at most 10 books being present in the household as a child. Similarly, we use an indicator variable poor standard taking the value of 1 if none of the following amenities were present in the house during the childhood of the respondent: fixed bath, cold and hot water supply, inside toilet, and central heating. Summary statistics on the main variables of interest can be found in Table 2 for individuals growing up before and after de facto unilateral divorce laws have been introduced. Overall, it is hard to ascertain whether growing up under unilateral divorce entails disadvantages for children because cohort effects confound this innovation in family law. We employ a difference-in-differences approach using OLS. Thus, we estimate linear probability models in case of binary outcomes. Since we are mainly interested in the effect of unilateral divorce laws, we do not expect that this choice makes a difference with respect to this coefficient in comparison to binary choice models such as logit or probit. Thus, we estimate a model of the following form:
where CO is the outcome for an individual i of cohort a (that is for a certain year of birth) living in country c described above. Unilateral is a dummy variable indicating whether unilateral divorce law was in effect when the individual was 18 years old. We control for differences in countries by employing a full set of country dummies (η c ). In addition, we control for cohort or age, respectively, by including a full set of year of birth dummies (η a ). Since we have only cross-sectional data, we cannot distinguish between cohort and age effects as they are (almost) perfectly collinear. 1 In addition, we control for country-specific trends by including interactions between the country dummies and year of birth η c × yob i . In additional robustness checks, we also include interactions of the country dummies with higher order polynomials of year of birth. The X contains additional control variables including a gender dummy and variables capturing the socioeconomic status of the individuals' parents during childhood and an indicator for living together with both biological parents at age 10. By controlling for these individual characteristics of the household during childhood, it is possible to control for one mechanism by which unilateral divorce laws affect children's well-being. If these laws increase the likelihood of parental marital disruption, and this is the only mechanism, then the coefficients on the childhood variables should absorb much of the effect of unilateral divorce laws and render the coefficient on exposure to unilateral divorce law small and statistically insignificant. On the other hand, if the coefficient on unilateral divorce law is hardly changed after the inclusion of additional control variables for childhood family structure and socioeconomic status, then it is likely that unilateral divorce laws affect children also in intact marriages, for instance by affecting the bargaining positions of spouses. Another potential advantage of controlling for childhood variables is to increase precision of estimates if these variables are important predictors of long-term outcomes.
In addition to the availability of childhood variables, the use of SHARE-LIFE data has several advantages but also disadvantages compared to Gruber's (2004) use of the US census data. First of all, using cross-national variation has the marked disadvantage that the European countries are potentially less homogenous than the 50 US states. Therefore, the assumption that countries from the treatment group would have followed the same trend as countries from the control group if there had been no introduction of unilateral divorce laws is more likely to be violated. We therefore test our results by checking whether the exact definition of the control groups in our quasi-experimental setting substantially influences our results. Restricting our sample to groups of more homogenous countries as, for instance, Scandinavia gives more confidence in our results. The use of cross-national European data is also a virtue compared to the US census data. The US census only contains state of birth and state of residence and therefore results could be biased because of selective migration (Gruber 2004; Heckman et al. 1996) . This problem should be less severe because there is less transnational migration in Europe as compared to interstate migration in the USA. Furthermore, migration in Europe is probably not related to differences in divorce laws as usually the divorce laws of the country where the marriage is contracted are applied (González and Viitanen 2009 ).
Results
The results for the basic model specification are shown in Table 3 , panel A. In the first row, results are shown for a basic model without further covariates and without a country-specific linear trend. According to these estimates, unilateral divorce law has no appreciable effect on adults' completed education, overweight, self-rated health, or depressive symptoms. One finds, however, marked effects on the probability of ever being married (−3 percentage points) and having kids (−5 percentage points). Furthermore, individuals growing up under unilateral divorce laws have a marked reduction of ever starting smoking (−6 percentage points). These results are not strongly affected by the inclusion of controls for family structure and socioeconomic status during childhood (panel B), except for the effect on overweight which increases in size and becomes statistically significant, perhaps because the estimates get more precise. Growing up under unilateral divorce increases the probability of being overweight later on in life (+4 percentage points). This leads us tentatively to conclude that the effect of unilateral divorce laws on children's outcomes is mainly driven by their effects on intra-household bargaining in existing marriages.
Gruber (2004) used a back-of-the-envelope calculation to gauge whether changes in divorce probabilities can account for the effects on children's outcomes and comes to a similar conclusion than we do. He found quite substantial effects of unilateral divorce laws on children's later life outcomes but only relatively small effects on the likelihood of parental, marital disruption. If unilateral divorce laws affected later life outcomes only by changing this probability, then parental divorce would have to have a very large effect as Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. Unilateral is an indicator taking the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place when respondent was 18 years old. Poor standard is the indicator for the lack of amenities in the home when respondent was a child, <10 books indicates that there were at most 10 books present in the home of the respondent as a child * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.1 (significant) only a small group is affected. He concluded that these effects would have to be too large to be credible leading him to believe that unilateral divorce laws must have also affect the outcomes of children in intact marriages. Our results are reassuring for his conclusion because he was not able to directly use micro-data on whether the children's parents have in fact separated. Our results for health behaviors also mirror Gruber's results for USA who has also shown some adverse effects on adults who have grown up under unilateral divorce. However, we find exactly the opposite effect on family formation and child bearing than Gruber did. Whereas he found earlier marriages and earlier childbirths, we find that individuals growing up under unilateral divorce are less likely to get married and they also are more often childless.
Robustness checks
In this section, we probe the robustness of our results. We first use an alternative specification of exposure to unilateral divorce laws in youth as our explanatory variable; second, we check whether unobserved trends are driving our results by utilizing different specifications of country-specific cohort effects; and third, we restrict our samples to get more homogenous control groups.
6.1 Alternative specification of exposure to unilateral divorce laws Our definition of exposure to unilateral divorce laws is somewhat arbitrary. It takes the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place when the individual was 18 years old, zero otherwise. This basic specification facilitates comparison with Gruber (2004) and González and Viitanen; however, at the same time, we lose valuable identifying information. As an alternative specification, we construct a variable measuring the years of exposure to unilateral divorce laws before the 18th birthday.
2 The results are presented in Table 4 . The results using this alternative specification are qualitatively similar to those of the basic specification. We find strong effects of exposure to unilateral divorce laws on family formation and the probability of having kids. Because we do have little theoretical guidance which is the correct measure of childhood exposure to unilateral divorce laws, it is reassuring that the exact definition does not seem to play a major role in driving our main results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. Expose18 are the number of years the individual lived under unilateral divorce laws before the age of 18. Poor standard is the indicator for the lack of amenities in the home when respondent was a child, <10 books indicates that there were at most 10 books present in the home of the respondent as a child. Both parents is an indicator for the presence of both biological parents at age 10 * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01; * * * p < 0.1
Country-specific trends
Another concern with our identification strategy is that there are no unobserved country-specific cohort trends which are correlated with the change in unilateral divorce laws. There are a couple of noteworthy policy initiatives in Europe affecting our outcomes which are potentially correlated with changes in unilateral divorce laws. All European countries experienced an educational expansion during this period potentially masking the effects of the changes in unilateral divorce laws. The extension of mandatory schooling which roughly falls into the same period (see for instance Pischke and von Wachter (2008) ). For Germany, Jürges et al. (2011) and Kemptner et al. (2011) have found a positive effect of education on health behavior when using school constructions or mandatory schooling, respectively, as instruments. Thus, our results for unilateral divorce laws are potentially contaminated by those policies happening at the same time as changes in divorce laws. While we do not want to model the potential effects of those other policy initiatives, we use more flexible country-specific cohort trends to for those policy changes.
In particular, we include linear, quadratic, and cubic country-specific cohort trends in our specifications. These results are presented in Table 5 . We find that the coefficient estimates on unilateral divorce laws are remarkably stable when controlling for a linear or quadratic trend. When including a cubic trend, some of our estimates lose statistical significance. However, in most cases-even though the coefficient estimates are not significant anymore-point estimates are still rather close to those when not controlling for country-specific trends. Therefore, we are confident that our results are not mainly driven by unobserved country-specific trends which are correlated with unilateral divorce laws.
Sample restrictions
Dropping Southern Europe
One concern with our estimates is that identification relies on the usual assumption of difference-in-differences estimates that we have found a suitable control group. In our case, identification mainly hinges on Denmark and the Netherlands while the other countries are either always in the treatment group (Sweden) or remain in the control group. In particular, the question arises whether southern European countries are a good control group for the experiences in Denmark and the Netherlands. There are large religious differences between southern Europe and Denmark and the Netherlands, and in addition divorce became only legal in Spain after the end of the Franco period in 1981. At the same time, economic growth was faster in Spain after it got admitted to the EU. Therefore, trends in outcomes could very well differ between southern Europe and Denmark and the Netherlands violating the assumptions behind the difference-in-differences approach. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. Unilateral is an indicator taking the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place when respondent was 18 years old * p < 0.05; * * p < 0.01 Table 6 Dropping southern Europe
Years of education Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. Unilateral is an indicator taking the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place when respondent was 18 years old. Poor standard is the indicator for the lack of amenities in the home when respondent was a child, <10 books indicates that there were at most 10 books present in the home of the respondent as a child. Both parents is an indicator for the presence of both biological parents at age 10 * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01 Table 7 Sweden and Denmark only
Years of education Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for country fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, country-specific linear cohort trends, and gender. Unilateral is an indicator taking the value of 1 if unilateral divorce laws were in place when respondent was 18 years old. Poor standard is the indicator for the lack of amenities in the home when respondent was a child, <10 books indicates that there were at most 10 books present in the home of the respondent as a child. Both parents is an indicator for the presence of both biological parents at age 10 * p < 0.1; * * p < 0.05; * * * p < 0.01
We therefore present additional results where we drop the southern European countries from our analysis. The results are presented in Table 6 .
Overall, it does not appear that the exclusion of southern European countries from our sample affects the results much. In contrast to the complete sample, the effect on overweight becomes insignificant, but the effects on smoking and family formation are remarkably similar to our baseline results.
Restrict sample to Denmark and Sweden
We can even go one step further and restrict our sample to just Denmark and Sweden which are probably the two most homogenous countries in our sample. Sweden had introduced unilateral divorce already in 1915 and thus serves as a control group for Denmark introducing unilateral divorce in the 1970s. The results for this robustness check are presented in Table 7 .
When restricting the sample to Denmark and Sweden, we use robust standard errors because estimation of clustered standard errors becomes too problematic with two clusters. Overall, we confirm our previous results about the effect of unilateral divorce on health behaviors and family formation. In addition, we find a negative effect of unilateral divorce laws on educational attainment similar to Gruber's results for USA.
Conclusion
Starting from Lundberg and Pollak's (1993) theoretical insight that the welfare of divorced parents has an effect on intra-household allocation of intact marriages, we examine the change in unilateral divorce laws in Europe and its effect on children's outcomes. Theoretically, it is not clear how this shift in property rights within marriages should affect children's welfare as there are opposing forces at work. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) have shown a reduction in family distress after the introduction of unilateral divorce laws, and Rasul (2005) argues that marriages should be better matched after the introduction of unilateral divorce regimes. While we cannot investigate the development of family distress in our data set, we find some support for Rasul's notion that average match quality in marriages increases in a companion paper (Kneip et al. 2011) . On the other hand, this study also found an increase in female labor force participation in response to the introduction of unilateral divorce, and Gruber (2004) reports negative effects of unilateral divorce laws on children's welfare in USA. Overall, our results confirm Gruber's findings for USA as we find sizable negative effects of the exposure to unilateral divorce laws on health behavior of children and, at least for the Scandinavian countries, on educational attainment. These results are not driven by the effect on unilateral divorce laws on the probability of parental separation because if we condition on living in an intact family at age 10 our estimates are hardly changed. We therefore conclude that the introduction of unilateral divorce laws changed the interactions of parents within the household and reduced investments into children, for instance because less time is spent with children as both parents have to work full time to maintain their outside options as marriage has lost part of its insurance value. Notice that our data do not allow us to further investigate Rasul's hypothesis on improved selection into marriage for the parents of the individuals in our sample as those would all have married before the introduction of unilateral divorce laws (except, to a small extent, in Sweden). For younger cohorts, this may play a role with an ambiguous effect on overall child welfare: it would be beneficial for children born in wedlock but potentially detrimental to children out-of-wedlock. If more children are born out-of-wedlock after the introduction of unilateral divorce, the overall effect can even be negative.
Our estimates have important policy implications, as more recently family policies have again been the focus of attention of policy makers. For instance, alimony payments have been reformed in Germany recently. In light of our results, this may also affect children in intact families as it affects the bargaining position of women within the household.
